Edited by Exponews Political desk.
Tamil Nadu has alleged that the New Education Policy 2020 attempts to impose Hindi in the Tamil-speaking state. What is the history of India’s policy on language in education, and how does NEP 2020 differ? Is it a bid to impose Hindi? A look at all sides of the debate. In a country as diverse as India, languages not only help connect but, at times, also create discordant notes. This is especially true when languages speak a political tongue. The latest example is the massive political storm over the three-language formula in New Education Policy (NEP) 2020, which Tamil Nadu Chief Minister MK Stalin alleges to attempt to impose Hindi in the Tamil-speaking state. Is the three-language formula will end up imposing Hindi on states that are unwilling to teach it?
Language in education, both as to the medium of instruction and the ones to be taught, was a tricky issue. Remember, states in India are formed on linguistic lines. The University Education Commission of 1948-49, which was chaired by Dr Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, delved into the language in education. Known as the Radhakrishnan Commission, it favored Hindi as India’s federal language and regional language for provincial purposes.
The commission’s suggestion of three languages for higher-secondary students would become the basis of the three-language formula. The New Education Policy (NEP), which was approved by the Union Cabinet in 2020, reintroduces the three-language formula, a concept first introduced in the NEP of 1968. NEP 1968 was based on the Kothari Commission report, which suggested the promotion of three languages in education, a brainchild of then Congress Govt. at the Centre. While NEP 1968 made Hindi mandatory, NEP 2020 gives states the option to choose a third language. “However, there will be a greater flexibility in the three-language formula, and no language will be imposed on any State,” says the NEP 2020 document.
A modern Indian language, which is preferably to be any Southern language apart from Hindi and English in the Hindi-speaking states. Hindi and English, along with the regional languages, were to be part of the non-Hindi-speaking states in India. Hindi was intended to be developed as a link language and as a medium of expression for the composite culture of India.
“The Radhakrishnan Commission suggested mother tongue as the medium of education, so did all the education policies, including the one of 1986,” says educationist Navneet Sharma, adding, “There is nothing new or unique about NEP 2020.” It suggested that for every region to participate in federal activities and to promote nationwide solidarity, “…Educated India has to make up its mind to be bilingual, and pupils at the higher secondary and university stages will have to know three languages”.
.Tamil Nadu’s history of resistance to Hindi dates back to 1937 when the Congress government in the then Madras Presidency made Hindi mandatory in schools. The move, seen as an erosion of Dravidian heritage, sparked massive outrage among Tamils. Periyar EV Ramasamy made anti-Hindi one of the key planks of his Dravidian movement. The state saw hundreds of deaths in 1965 — the year Hindi was to be made India’s official language — and the state burned until the Centre decided to put the plan on the back burner. Between February 10 and 15, 1965, violent clashes erupted across Tamil Nadu, forcing the police to open fire in at least 20 locations to disperse mobs.
Rampaging mobs set fire to scores of railway stations, post offices, police stations, and other public buildings. Nearly every passing train was stoned, and buses were reduced to ashes. The worst violence unfolded in Kumarapalayam, Coimbatore, where police opened fire on an out-of-control mob, killing 10 people, noted an India Today Magazine story from 1977 by Nambi Marthandam, headlined, Tamil Nadu: A place of savage resistance. “Savage mobs” even burnt alive two police officers, said the India Today Magazine report. While official figures place the death toll from police firing between 50 and 60, unofficial reports claim over 150 were killed and nearly 500 injured. It is pretty clear how the Dravidian ecosystem destroyed thousands of students’ dreams. The people of Tamil Nadu are sick and tired of depriving them of learning a pan-Indian language by narrow political narratives.
Any mention of three languages in schools for Tamil Nadu is synonymous with “Hindi imposition”. The state government also sees the funds attached to the PM SHRI scheme for model schools as the Centre riding roughshod over the state on the language issue. Despite NEP 2020 stressing on local languages in the three-language formula, Tamil Nadu remains suspicious. Though NEP 2020 doesn’t impose Hindi, Tamil Nadu argues it facilitates its “backdoor entry” and more so by linking education funds to it.
Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.K. Stalin is treading a dangerous and divisive path with his latest move—replacing the symbol with a Tamil script symbol. While it may seem like a harmless assertion of cultural pride, the implications of this decision are far more sinister. This is not just a regional or linguistic statement; it is a calculated political maneuver designed to carve out a separate Tamil identity, distinct from India’s national character. The move raises serious questions about Stalin’s long-term ideological trajectory and whether he is subtly working towards a renewed push for Tamil sub-nationalism. Symbols carry immense significance, representing ideology, history, and political intent. The symbol, officially adopted in 2010, was created to reflect both the Devanagari letter “`” (Ra) and the Roman letter “R’, encapsulating India’s diverse linguistic heritage while maintaining a unified economic identity. By attempting to replace it with a Tamil-specific symbol, Stalin is challenging this very unity. This is not just a matter of regional pride—it is an open provocation against the idea of a united India. A national currency symbol is meant to transcend regional boundaries and linguistic divisions, acting as a unifying factor in a vast and diverse nation. Altering it to reflect a state’s distinct identity sends a dangerous message: that Tamil Nadu does not see itself as fully integrated with the rest of India.
To understand the deeper motives behind this move, one must examine the history of Dravidian politics. The DMK, led first by M. Karunanidhi and now by M.K. Stalin, has always maintained a precarious balance between regional pride and anti-India rhetoric. The Dravidian movement, from which the DMK emerged, initially advocated for a separate Dravida Nadu—a demand that was later abandoned for political reasons. However, the ideological undercurrents of Tamil separatism have never entirely disappeared. Over the years, the DMK has consistently pushed narratives that seek to distinguish Tamil Nadu from the rest of India. Whether it is their staunch opposition to Hindi, their efforts to paint Tamil culture as distinct from the broader Hindu ethos, or their continuous hostility towards the central government, the party has repeatedly stoked regional sentiments to consolidate political power.
Now, with this currency move, Stalin is taking these divisive tactics to an even more extreme level. It is not just about cultural pride—it is about laying the groundwork for an economic and ideological distinction between Tamil Nadu and the rest of India. This raises several alarming questions. Is this an attempt to undermine India’s economic unity? If Tamil Nadu introduces its rupee symbol today, what stops Maharashtra, Karnataka, or West Bengal from doing the same tomorrow? If each state begins asserting its own financial identity, we risk fragmenting the very fabric of our national economy. More disturbingly, does this indicate a deeper separatist agenda? While outright secession is unlikely, the systematic push to cultivate a Tamil identity that exists independently of India is a step in that direction. This aligns with the ambitions of certain radical elements who seek to exploit Tamil nationalism for their ends.
